Digital Platform Dominance and the Potential for Monopoly: A Review of Competition Law in Indonesia

Abstract

The rapid growth of Indonesia’s digital economy, with a Gross Merchandise Value (GMV) projected to reach US$99 billion in 2025, has led to a concentration of market power among digital platforms operating through network effects, data control, and ecosystem integration (Google Indonesia, 2025; Domestic Trade Policy Center, 2025). This condition has given rise to various anti-competitive practices such as predatory pricing, self-preferencing, killer acquisitions, and consumer data exploitation, which are difficult to address under conventional legal frame

The rapid growth of Indonesia’s digital economy, with a Gross Merchandise Value (GMV) projected to reach US$99 billion in 2025, has led to a concentration of market power among digital platforms operating through network effects, data control, and ecosystem integration (Google Indonesia, 2025; Domestic Trade Policy Center, 2025). This condition has given rise to various anti-competitive practices such as predatory pricing, self-preferencing, killer acquisitions, and consumer data exploitation, which are difficult to address under conventional legal frameworks (OECD, 2022; Rasbin et al., 2025). Previous studies have generally discussed digital business competition in broad terms but have not specifically examined the conceptual limitations of Law No. 5 of 1999 in addressing the characteristics of data- and algorithm-driven digital platform dominance (Setiawati et al., 2023; Ahadi, 2025). This study aims to analyze the adequacy of monopoly and dominant position provisions under Law No. 5 of 1999, identify forms of anti-competitive conduct by digital platforms in Indonesia, and examine the relevance of international regulations for reforming Indonesian competition law. The research employs normative legal research using statutory, conceptual, and comparative approaches (Soekanto, 2007; Marzuki, 2017). The findings indicate that Law No. 5 of 1999 can still be applied in principle, as demonstrated in KPPU Decision No. 03/KPPU-I/2024. However, the law contains structural gaps in defining digital markets, recognizing data-based market power, and conducting cross-jurisdictional oversight (Sabirin & Herfian, 2021). The ex ante approach adopted in the European Union’s Digital Markets Act and the enforcement of the United States Sherman Act provide important lessons for Indonesia in promoting competition law reforms that are adaptive to the platform economy (Cran & Thomas, 2022; Cross et al., 2024).

works (OECD, 2022; Rasbin et al., 2025). Previous studies have generally discussed digital business competition in broad terms but have not specifically examined the conceptual limitations of Law No. 5 of 1999 in addressing the characteristics of data- and algorithm-driven digital platform dominance (Setiawati et al., 2023; Ahadi, 2025).
This study aims to analyze the adequacy of monopoly and dominant position provisions under Law No. 5 of 1999, identify forms of anti-competitive conduct by digital platforms in Indonesia, and examine the relevance of international regulations for reforming Indonesian competition law. The research employs normative legal research using statutory, conceptual, and comparative approaches (Soekanto, 2007; Marzuki, 2017). The findings indicate that Law No. 5 of 1999 can still be applied in principle, as demonstrated in KPPU Decision No. 03/KPPU-I/2024. However, the law contains structural gaps in defining digital markets, recognizing data-based market power, and conducting cross-jurisdictional oversight (Sabirin & Herfian, 2021). The ex ante approach adopted in the European Union’s Digital Markets Act and the enforcement of the United States Sherman Act provide important lessons for Indonesia in promoting competition law reforms that are adaptive to the platform economy (Cran & Thomas, 2022; Cross et al., 2024).